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THE MARKET REVOLUTION IN BANK AND
INSURANCE FIRM GOVERNANCE: ITS LOGIC
AND LIMITS
DAVID A. SKEEL, JR. *
INTRODUCTION
By any yardstick, these are times of great transition in the financial
services industry. The divisions among commercial banking, investment
banking, and insurance established by the Glass-Steagall Act1 more than
sixty-five years ago have steadily eroded, and many expect Congress to
jettison them soon. Many banks issue insurance-like annuities, and
investment banking subsidiaries of commercial banks have become
increasingly common. At the same time, an unprecedented wave of bank
mergers has transformed bank governance. Exemplifying both trends,
Citibank and Travelers threw caution to the wind and completed a Glass-
Steagall defying merger in the expectation that Congress would undo the law
before it was too late.2
These are not your father’s financial intermediaries, the trends seem to
suggest. More than ever before, the governance of U.S. banks and insurance
firms has come to resemble the governance of other U.S. firms, with
takeovers and attention to stock prices playing an uncharacteristically central
role. This market revolution in bank and insurance governance raises an
obvious question: How far will the current trends go? Will financial firm
governance and insolvency regulation eventually replicate the governance of
nonfinancial firms?
This Article attempts to address these questions. The short answer the
Article provides—that we cannot expect true convergence between financial
and nonfinancial firm governance—will not come as an enormous surprise.
But exploring the recent trends in banking and insurance from a corporate
* Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. I am grateful to Heidi Black and the
Washington University Law Quarterly for inviting me to participate in this Symposium, and to Ronald
Mann, Lisa Schiltz, and the conference participants for helpful comments.
1. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.).
2. See generally Phil Kuntz, Per Usual, Bank Bill Fails To Pass but Succeeds as Big Congressional
Campaign Fund-Raiser, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20, 1998, at A24 (noting Citigroup’s need for legislation in
order to retain insurance underwriting). For a valuable overview and analysis of the recent trends, see Allen
N. Berger et al., The Consolidation of the Financial Service Industry: Causes, Consequences, and
Implications for the Future, 23 J. BANKING & FIN. (forthcoming 1999).
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governance perspective will both shed light on the significance of the new
developments and suggest several changes lawmakers might make to
improve the current insolvency framework. The Article will focus especially
on commercial banks and to a lesser extent on insurance companies, but
much of the analysis also applies to other bank-like financial intermediaries.
The central assumption of the Article is that we must consider both
corporate governance and the background insolvency procedures to fully
appreciate the overall governance framework.3 This is because the
relationship between corporate governance and insolvency tends to be
complementary. The governance of nonfinancial U.S. firms, for instance,
relies on reactive correctives, such as takeovers, to address conflicts of
interest between managers and widely scattered shareholders. If the firm
fails, U.S. corporations can invoke a manager-driven reorganization option.
In other nations, such as Germany and Japan, banks and other large investors
actively participate in corporate governance, and bankruptcy is characterized
by immediate displacement of managers and liquidation of the firm. I
describe U.S. governance as an “ex post” approach and the German and
Japanese alternative as an “ex ante” approach.4
Unlike that of nonfinancial U.S. firms, the governance of U.S. banks and
insurance companies has long been ex ante in character. Takeovers and other
ex post correctives have been rare, and insolvency means immediate removal
of the managers and liquidation of the firm. Although the principal overseer
of bank and insurance managers is a governmental regulator rather than a
private investor, the overall governance framework functions very much like
the approach used by nonfinancial firms in Germany and Japan.
The recent changes in bank and insurance firm governance have
introduced a significantly greater market component, but the regulatory
framework puts real limits on how far the transition can or will go. Despite
the changes, bank and insurance governance has retained much of its
traditional character.
As the discussion thus far suggests, much of the Article’s analysis is
3. I have presented and analyzed this assumption in several of my other works. See, e.g., David A.
Skeel, Jr., An Evolutionary Theory of Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1325
(1998) [hereinafter Skeel, An Evolutionary Theory]; David A. Skeel, Jr., Rethinking the Line Between
Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 72 TEX. L. REV. 471 (1994) [hereinafter Skeel, Rethinking the
Line].
4. The characterization of governance as “ex ante” or “ex post” is introduced in Skeel, An
Evolutionary Theory, supra note 3, at 1328, and corresponds loosely to the distinction other commentators
have made between “bank-centered” and “stock market-centered” systems. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson,
Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency: When Do Institutions Matter?, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 327,
328 (1996).
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descriptive rather than normative in character. In discussing the treatment of
insolvent banks and insurers, however, the Article offers several explicit
prescriptions for improving the governance framework. First, in order to
reduce managers’ current incentives to avoid insolvency proceedings at all
costs, and to harness managers’ superior information about the firm, both
bank and insurance insolvency law must be changed. Bank insolvency law
should permit managers to propose a “prepackaged” purchase and
assumption transaction (transferring the bank’s assets and liabilities to
another bank).5 In insurance insolvency, lawmakers should provide a
traditional reorganization option. The Article also argues that lawmakers
should add insurance insolvency (though not bank insolvency) to the
Bankruptcy Code.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the relationship between
corporate law and insolvency in the overall corporate governance framework.
It also contrasts the ex post framework that characterizes most U.S.
nonfinancial firms with the ex ante approach one sees in U.S. bank and
insurance firm governance. Part II then explores the recent transition in bank
and insurance governance. It first considers the increasing influence of
market-oriented governance techniques in the financial services industry and
whether this market revolution will dissolve the distinctions between
financial and nonfinancial firm governance. The Part then focuses in even
greater detail on the insolvency framework and the ways it might be
improved.
I. THE SYSTEMS OF FINANCIAL AND NONFINANCIAL FIRM GOVERNANCE:
THEORY AND HISTORY
Much of the recent literature on nonfinancial firms in the United States
emphasizes the extent to which U.S. corporate governance reflects politics
rather than simply economic necessity.6 A more complete explanation of
U.S. corporate governance must also account for the role of corporate
bankruptcy, as well as the economic and political forces that have shaped its
evolution. In order to provide such an explanation, this Part sketches out a
theory that highlights the complementary relationship between corporate
governance and insolvency law.7 The Part first shows that U.S. corporate
5. For a discussion of purchase and assumption transactions, see infra note 42 and
accompanying text.
6. The wellspring of much of this literature, and the seminal work, is MARK J. ROE, STRONG
MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS (1994). For a more complete overview and description, see Skeel, An
Evolutionary Theory, supra note 3, at 1332-39.
7. For an earlier version of the general theory, see Skeel, An Evolutionary Theory, supra note 3. Part
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governance has moved in an ex post direction, relying on market correctives
such as takeovers and a manager-driven insolvency regime. It then
demonstrates how the governance and insolvency framework of financial
intermediaries reflects precisely the opposite approach. The Part ends with a
description of the existing regulatory framework of bank and insurance
company governance.
A. Complements and Substitutes in U.S. Corporate Law
In contrast with nations such as Japan and Germany, U.S. corporate
governance has long been characterized by relatively passive shareholdings
and, as a result, a sharp separation between ownership and control. In recent
years, institutional shareholders have acquired an eye-opening percentage of
the stock of America’s largest corporations, and a few public pension funds
have begun to play an important role in corporate governance.8 Ne theless,
U.S. shareholders still are far more passive than their Japanese and German
counterparts. Rather than active monitoring, U.S. investors look to ex post
correctives, such as hostile takeovers, to address poor performance.9
In addition to passive shareholders and ex post correctives, other features
of U.S. corporate governance include remarkably liquid securities markets
and active managerial labor markets. In recent decades, most U.S. firms also
have adopted stock options and other performance-based compensation
devices in an effort to align managers’ incentives more closely with
shareholders’ interests.10
Although these features are a useful starting point, one cannot fully
understand U.S. corporate governance without taking bankruptcy into
account. To see this point, it is helpful to focus in more detail on the
I further develops the framework and considers for the first time its implications for bank and insurance
firm governance.
8. One highly visible participant has been California’s public pension fund (“CalPERS”). The
question whether institutional shareholders will transform U.S. corporate governance has generated a
vigorous debate. For an optimistic view of institutional investors’ likely role, see generally Bernard S.
Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520 (1990). For more skeptical views, see
Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO.
L.J. 445 (1991) (exploring conflicts of interest and other factors that discourage monitoring by institutional
shareholders); Thomas A. Smith, Institutions and Entrepreneurs in American Corporate Finance, 85 CAL.
L. REV. 1 (1997) (suggesting financial intermediary “customers” prefer passivity to minimize risk).
9. The contrast in monitoring techniques between shareholders of U.S. firms and their counterparts
in Japan and Germany is an important theme in Roe’s political account of U.S. corporate governance. See
ROE, supra note 6; Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and the
United States, 102 YALE L.J. 1927 (1993).
10. For an empirical account of the increasing use of incentive-based compensation by U.S. firms, see
generally Randall Krozner, Were the Good Old Days that Good? (1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author).
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incentives of managers. Because they often lose their jobs after a takeover,
and at best lose much of their authority, the managers of possible takeover
targets have a strong interest in making takeovers difficult. As a result, U.S.
managers have adopted a wide variety of antitakeover devices to protect
themselves. Since the 1980s, these devices have ranged from staggered
boards and poison pills to share-repurchase arrangements that increase the
firm’s debt and diminish the free cash that bidders might otherwise use to
finance a takeover bid.11
For the managers of firms with significant debt and little free cash,
increasing the firm’s debtload is a double-edged sword. The added debt may
reduce the risk of a takeover, but it also increases the possibility of default. If
managers faced immediate replacement after default, they would have an
incentive either to protect themselves from takeovers in some other way—
perhaps by encouraging one or more investors to acquire a large, stable stake
in the firm—or to push the nation’s bankruptcy regime in a more manager-
friendly direction.12 American corporate governance reflects the second
approach. Although shareholdings are scattered and managers face the threat
of hostile takeovers, American bankruptcy law permits managers to continue
to run the firm (at least initially) after it files for bankruptcy.13
If American lawmakers had not prevented banks and other financial firms
from holding large stakes in nonfinancial firms, and if financial
intermediaries had assumed an active role in U.S. corporate governance,14 a
different bankruptcy regime might have developed. An investor who holds a
large stake in a firm has a much greater incentive than small investors to
monitor that firm. The more leverage the investor has over managers, the
more effective the monitoring will be. This is where bankruptcy comes in. A
manager-driven bankruptcy regime would undermine the investor’s leverage
because the managers in such a regime could credibly threaten to file for
11. Managers also have persuaded nearly every state to adopt antitakeover legislation that imposes
additional obstacles on takeover activity. For an account of the politics of antitakeover legislation, see
Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 111 (1987).
12. Investors also have good reason to favor these options. If a firm’s stock and debtholders are
widely scattered, investors face a coordination problem in the event the firm encounters financial distress.
Manager-initiated bankruptcy could be seen as a mechanism for solving the coordination problem. If
investors hold concentrated stakes, as in the ex ante framework described below, the investors themselves
can step in and restructure the firm, making bankruptcy largely unnecessary.
13. The seeds of the current U.S. bankruptcy framework were sown in the 1950s and came to fruition
with the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended in
scattered titles of U.S.C.). For a detailed discussion of the emergence of manager-initiated reorganization
during this period, see Skeel, An Evolutionary Theory, supra note 3, at 1372-79.
14. These obviously are big “ifs.” Although J.P. Morgan and other Wall Street banks engaged in
relational governance early in the century, it is quite possible that U.S. corporate governance would have
moved in an ex post direction even without legislative interference.
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bankruptcy rather than agree to changes demanded by the investor in the
event of financial distress. By contrast, if managers face the prospect of
immediate displacement, as they would in a manager-displacing bankruptcy
regime, they would have a strong incentive to heed the investor’s
suggestions.15
Simply put, manager-displacing bankruptcy is crucial to relational
governance in an ex ante system. We would therefore expect to see large,
active investors in nations with a manager-displacing bankruptcy regime; and
we would expect these concentrated investors to throw their political weight
behind manager-displacing bankruptcy and to resist the U.S.-style, manager-
driven approach.
As I have suggested, U.S. corporate governance has evolved in a very
different direction. Although J.P. Morgan and other Wall Street banks
engaged in relational governance early in the twentieth century, federal and
state lawmakers actively intervened to usher banks and other financial
intermediaries out of corporate governance.16 By tying the hands of financial
intermediaries, lawmakers eliminated the most likely source of concentrated
investment, and thus reinforced the fragmentation of U.S. stock ownership.
Liquid markets, scattered shareholdings, and ex post correctives began to
characterize U.S. corporate governance. On the bankruptcy side, a manager-
driven insolvency regime emerged (or more precisely, reemerged) at roughly
the same time to complete the ex post framework.17 Th  attributes of the two
approaches are summarized in Table 1.
15. See Skeel, An Evolutionary Theory, supra note 3, at 1344-45. For a similar point about the role of
banks in Canadian corporate governance, see F.H. Buckley, The Canadian Keiretsu, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN.,
Winter 1997, at 46, 52.
16. Much of the legislation as well as the popular pressure on financial intermediaries to diminish
their role in corporate governance were inspired by a series of investigations that included the Armstrong
investigation of large insurers in 1906 and the Pujo and Pecora investigations of Wall Street banks in the
early 1910s and early 1930s. For a detailed description of the investigations, see ROE, supra note 6, at 31-
35, 60-79, 110-11.
The most dramatic banking reforms came in the 1930s when Congress passed the Glass-Steagall
Act, among other measures. Insurance companies faced stringent limitations on their ability to own
stock for much of the century. See ROE, supra note 6, at 26. Mutual funds are permitted to hold large
amounts of equity but are discouraged from taking concentrated stakes by the Investment Company
Act of 1940 and the tax laws, both of which encourage diversification. See id. at 102-10. The
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) chills active monitoring by private
public funds, and manager control over the choice of investment advisor creates even greater
disincentives to activism. See id. at 125-26.
17. See Skeel, An Evolutionary Theory, supra note 3, at 1372-79; see also David A. Skeel, Jr., The
Rise and Fall of the SEC in Bankruptcy (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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Table 1: The Two Governance Approaches
Type of FrameworkCorporate Governance
Characteristics
Bankruptcy/Insolvency
Characteristics
Ex Ante Relational share/debtholders;
thin managerial labor markets
Manager-displacing,
liquidation-based
Ex Post Passive shareholders; liquid
securities markets; thick
managerial labor markets and
incentive-based compensation
Manager-driven,
reorganization-based
It is important to emphasize the extent to which corporate governance in
the United States, as elsewhere, reflects both politics and economics. Political
factors figure prominently, but so, too, do the different parties’ responses to
them. For example, the fragmentation of U.S. stock ownership gave parties
an incentive to adopt mechanisms other than relational governance for
addressing managerial agency costs, such as incentive-based compensation
and takeovers. Manager-driven bankruptcy is the natural complement to
these mechanisms, and such a bankruptcy approach has in fact emerged in
the United States.18 If lawmakers and courts had insisted on manager-
displacing bankruptcy instead, the mix of ex post corporate governance and
ex ante bankruptcy would have proven unstable. Because manager-
displacing bankruptcy would increase the gains available to relational
investing, investors might have begun to acquire concentrated stakes, thereby
pushing corporate governance in an ex ante direction.19
Investors did not do this, however. By the 1950s, American corporate
governance had turned in a decisively ex post direction. Although American
corporate bankruptcy had a manager-displacing character in the 1950s, this
began to change. The ex post pattern in American corporate governance soon
became clear.
B. The Ex Ante Habit of Bank and Insurance Firm Governance
Financial intermediaries have already figured prominently in this story.
Thus far, however, we have seen them only as investors in nonfinancial
18. Manager-driven bankruptcy offers a soft landing to managers of firms that have encountered
financial distress despite remaining otherwise viable, and it also addresses the coordination problem that
arises in the absence of concentrated investment. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
19. See Skeel, An Evolutionary Theory, supra note 3, at 1348 (noting that investors’ gains could stem
either from improved monitoring or from less benign sources such as “special treatment” from managers of
firm).
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corporations. An examination of the governance and insolvency of financial
intermediaries themselves quickly reveals an interesting irony. Although U.S.
nonfinancial firm governance has evolved in an ex post direction, the
governance of financial intermediaries has not followed; to the contrary, it
has developed characteristics that look strikingly different.
In the early decades of the nineteenth century, banks were treated largely
like other corporations. Both were chartered by the states and were managed
by a small group of shareholders who held most or all of the firm’s stock.20
The separation between ownership and control came later,21 nd unless the
state intervened to help out, a failing firm was invariably liquidated.
Not until the late nineteenth century did the railroads emerge as the
nation’s first large corporations. As the railroads and other firms grew to
unprecedented size,22 the governance of these firms exemplified the
separation of ownership and control that Berle and Means would document
in the 1930s.23 The late nineteenth century also witnessed a remarkable
development in railroad insolvency law. When large numbers of railroads
failed, often due to a combination of overexpansion and a downturn in the
national economy, nearly everyone agreed that both the public good and the
interests of shareholders and other stakeholders required preservation rather
than liquidation.24 Although neither Congress nor the states could easily
intervene, the courts did. Over a period of several decades, state and federal
courts managed to transform ordinary foreclosure law into a device for
corporate reorganization that became known as equity receivership.25
Although the stock of banks and insurance companies also became more
widely held during the course of the nineteenth century, bank and insurance
firm ownership remained more concentrated, and the insolvency approach
retained its ex ante character. The National Bank Act, for instance, subjected
shareholders to “double liability”—an obligation to contribute up to the
amount they had paid for their stock if the bank failed.26 Similarly, some
20. The earliest U.S. corporations tended to be banks and corporations formed to complete quasi-
public projects such as building turnpikes and bridges. See, e.g., 2 JOSEPH S. DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE
EARLIER HISTORY OF AMERICAN CORPORATIONS 3, 21-33 (1917); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY
OF AMERICAN LAW 188-89 (2d ed. 1985).
21. Though not nearly so late as is often thought. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Politics of
Corporate Governance, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL. 671, 684 (1995) (separation present almost from
beginning).
22. For a classic account of the emergence of modern business enterprises, see ALFRED D.
CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977).
23. See ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
24. For a detailed account, see Skeel, An Evolutionary Theory, supra note 3, at 1353-58.
25. See id.
26. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Double Liability of Bank Shareholders:
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states experimented with coinsurance arrangements that held other banks
liable if one of the banks in the group failed.27 E ch of these approaches
discouraged failure by penalizing either the shareholders (under double
liability) or other banks (under coinsurance) if a bank failed.
Interestingly, the same package of New Deal reforms that reinforced the
ex post tendencies in nonfinancial firm governance produced precisely the
opposite effect for financial intermediaries. This was especially true for
banks. At the same time that it introduced deposit insurance to protect
depositors, the Banking Act of 193328 also introduced stringent new capital
requirements to reduce banks’ ability to take risks at the expense of the
insurance scheme.29 In addition, regulators were given sweeping authority to
remove a bank’s managers and initiate insolvency proceedings if the bank
encountered financial distress.
The New Deal does not figure as prominently in the history of insurance
company governance, both because state regulators rather than Congress
have long regulated insurance law,30 and because the Depression did not
create as great a crisis for insurance companies as it did for banks.
Nevertheless, the historical picture is similar. As with bank regulators,
insurance regulators have a pervasive, ongoing role in governance. They also
hold the reins to the insolvency framework, which immediately displaces
managers when an insolvency proceeding is initiated.
Before we jump to the conclusion that bank and insurance firm
governance reflects (and has always reflected) the ex ante strategy I have
described, we must consider two important complications. The first is the
nature of the relational monitor. Whereas private investors (who often are
themselves banks, as we have seen) serve as the relational monitors of
nonfinancial German and Japanese firms, the monitors of U.S. banks and
insurers are governmental regulators. Not least of the differences is that
governmental regulators do not have the same direct financial interests as a
private investor. Regulators focus on “safety and soundness,” whereas
History and Implications, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 31 (1992).
27. See Charles W. Calomiris, Deposit Insurance: Lessons from the Record, ECON. PERSP.,
May/June 1989, at 10 (describing nineteenth century state-run bank insurance schemes).
28. Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
29. See, e.g., Michael Klausner, An Economic Analysis of Bank Regulatory Reform: The Financial
Institutions Safety and Consumer Choice Act of 1991, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 695, 713-14 (1991) (describing
capital requirements and moral hazards stemming from their imperfections).
30. State regulation of insurance law was assured by Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 183
(1868), which held that the Commerce Clause forbids federal regulation of insurance. Paul was eventually
overruled by United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 543-49, 553 (1944), but
Congress quickly passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act, Pub. L. No. 79-15, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1994)), to ensure continued state control.
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private relational investors seek to maximize profitability. In practice,
however, the similarities between private, relational investors in Germany
and Japan, on the one hand, and U.S. bank and insurance regulators, on the
other, prove far more striking than the ostensible differences. Both regulators
and private investors have access to substantial soft information about firm
performance, for instance. Although German and Japanese relational
investors have a direct financial stake in the nonfinancial firms they monitor,
they, like governmental regulators, have an incentive to discourage even
beneficial risk taking because the monitors themselves are highly leveraged,
often hold substantial debt stakes in the firms they monitor, and are closely
regulated.31 In effect, the private relational monitors of German and Japanese
corporations focus on the safety and soundness of the firms they invest in,
just as U.S. bank and insurance regulators do.
The second complication involves going concern value. The governance
theory developed in this Article is designed to identify different approaches
to preserving and enhancing a firm’s going concern value. Because banks
and insurers hold unusually liquid assets, there is a real question how much
going concern value they have–that is, how much the value of their franchise
as a whole exceeds the value of the individual assets. In the absence of going
concern value, the theory would have little application because there would
be nothing to preserve or enhance. On inspection, financial firms do have at
least some value beyond the value of their individual assets. For banks, for
instance, customer service networks and depositor lists may have substantial
value. But it is important to keep in mind that the going concern value of
financial intermediaries is less obvious than that of nonfinancial firms.
C. Banks and Insurance: Regulation and Insolvency
Thus far, this Article has considered the governance of U.S. financial and
nonfinancial firms from a general and historical perspective. This section
concludes our initial discussion by providing a brief description of the
existing regulatory framework.
Banks are regulated by one or more of four different regulators.32 The
Comptroller of the Currency regulates national banks; both state regulators
31. For a discussion of these incentives, see Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate
Governance and Commercial Banking: A Comparative Examination of Germany, Japan, and the
United States, 48 STAN. L. REV. 73, 96 (1995).
32. In addition to the regulation of individual banks as described below, bank holding companies
are regulated by the Federal Reserve. For a description and discussion of the tension between the
Federal Reserve and the Comptroller over financial services reform, see Bevis Longstreth & Ivan E.
Mattei, Organizational Freedom for Banks: The Case in Support, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1895 (1997).
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and the Federal Reserve oversee state banks that have joined the Federal
Reserve system; and both state regulators and the FDIC have jurisdiction
over state banks that do not join the Federal Reserve system.33
Notwithstanding the multiple sources of regulation, much of the regulation is
comparable for most banks. For example, the vast majority of banks
participate in the deposit insurance system, which guarantees a maximum of
$100,000 per account,34 and all banks are statutorily subject to similar capital
requirements.35
Regulators monitor banks in a number of ways. They conduct regular
audits, they oversee the issuance of bank charters, and they have authority to
approve or disapprove mergers and other consolidations among banks.36
Prior to the FDIC Improvement Act of 1991 (“FDICIA”),37 a bank’s
principal regulator also determined whether and when to initiate an
insolvency proceeding if the bank encountered financial distress. Thus, the
Comptroller made the insolvency decision for national banks; state regulators
or the Federal Reserve did so for state banks belonging to the Federal
Reserve system; and state regulators alone had this authority for nonmember
banks.38 In response to widespread dissatisfaction with state regulators’
handling of the bank failures of the 1980s, however, Congress significantly
expanded the FDIC’s authority when it enacted FDICIA. As a result, the
FDIC now can initiate an insolvency proceeding for any bank.39
A common theme in every bank insolvency is that bank managers are
immediately displaced, and insolvency results in liquidation rather than
reorganization.40 When bank regulators decide to intervene, they generally
set up a receivership and liquidate the troubled bank’s assets in one of three
ways.41 First, in a purchase and assumption transaction (“P&A”), a favorite
33. See David A. Skeel, Jr., The Law and Finance of Bank and Insurance Insolvency Regulation, 76
TEX. L. REV. 723, 727-28 (1998).
34. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
35. See 12 U.S.C. § 3907(a) (1994) (requiring regulators to set minimum capital levels).
36. For a discussion of bank consolidation jurisdiction, see James A. Bernstein, Mergers and
Acquisitions: The Legal Hurdles Banks Face in Choosing to Consolidate, 109 BANKING L.J. 205, 221-24
(1992).
37. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat.
2236 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
38. See Paul W. Grace, Regulatory Seizure of Banks and Thrifts, in BANKS AND THRIFTS:
INTRODUCTION TO FDIC/RTC RECEIVERSHIP LAW 177, 180-95 (PLI Commercial Law & Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 616, 1992) [hereinafter RECEIVERSHIP LAW] (explaining role of regulators in
insolvency initiation both before and after FDICIA).
39. See id. at 180-83.
40. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(f)(2)(F)(ii)-(iii) (1994) (authorizing regulators to dismiss directors
and officers).
41. For a more detailed overview of the resolution techniques described below, see Skeel, supra note
33, at 728-30, 767-72; see also EDWARD L. SYMONS, JR. & JAMES J. WHITE, BANKING LAW 604-07 (3d
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technique in the 1980s, regulators can transfer some or all of the troubled
bank’s assets and liabilities to a healthy bank.42 Alter atively, in an insured
deposit transaction, regulators can transfer a bank’s insured deposits, but not
its assets, to a third party. As a final option, regulators can liquidate the
bank’s assets and pay off its insured depositors in a straight liquidation. In the
1980s bank regulators had almost unbridled discretion in deciding which
option to pursue. When FDICIA was enacted, however, the same legislation
that expanded the FDIC’s role in initiation of insolvency proceedings also
provided a detailed framework of prompt corrective action regulations
prescribing both how and when regulators must act when a bank encounters
financial distress.43
As noted above, insurance companies are regulated entirely by state
regulators.44 Although the insurer’s primary regulator is the insurance
commissioner of its domicile state, the insurer also is subject to regulation by
every state in which its policy holders live. Insurance regulation varies from
state to state, but most states have adopted either the Insurers Rehabilitation
and Liquidation Model Act (“NAIC Model Act”),45 drafted and promoted by
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, or the older Uniform
Insurers Liquidation Act.46
Like bank regulators, insurance regulators conduct regular audits and
focus on minimum capital standards as a means of enhancing insurance
stability.47 The insurer counterpart to deposit insurance is states’ guaranty
funds. In the last three decades, most states have established guaranty funds
designed to protect policyholders who live in the state in the event their
insurer fails.48 These funds tend to set relatively low limits on their coverage,
however, and thus far they have played only a limited role in insurance
company governance.
Like their counterparts in banking, insurance regulators have exclusive
ed. 1991).
42. In the 1980s regulators often structured P&A’s to protect not just insured bank depositors, but
also uninsured ones. For a criticism of this policy, see Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Bank
Failures, Risk Monitoring, and the Market for Bank Control, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1153, 1182-84 (1988).
43. For an overview of these regulations, see Skeel, supra note 33, at 740-42.
44. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
45. See INSURERS REHABILITATION AND LIQUIDATION MODEL ACT (National Ass’n of Ins.
Comm’rs 1995) [hereinafter NAIC MODEL ACT].
46. See UNIF. INSURERS LIQUIDATION ACT (1939). For a discussion and lists of the states that have
enacted each of the statutes, see Kent M. Forney, Insurer Insolvencies and Guaranty Associations, 43
DRAKE L. REV. 813, 817-18 nn.42-44 (1995).
47. See, e.g., J. David Cummins et al., Insolvency Experience, Risk-Based Capital, and Prompt
Corrective Action in Property-Liability Insurance, 19 J. BANKING & FIN. 511 (1995).
48. For a brief description, see Skeel, supra note 33, at 732.
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control over the decision to initiate an insolvency proceeding.49 Insolvency
proceedings take one of two forms: liquidation or rehabilitation. In a
liquidation, regulators simply sell off and distribute the insurer’s assets; in a
rehabilitation, regulators attempt to stabilize the insurer in order to
rehabilitate it, failure of which will lead to a subsequent liquidation. The state
insurance commissioner serves as rehabilitator or conservator.50 The
managers of the insurer are routinely replaced and rarely participate in the
insolvency process.
II. THE TRANSFORMATION OF FINANCIAL FIRM GOVERNANCE AND
INSOLVENCY
For much of the immediate post-World War II era, bank and insurance
governance fit neatly and comfortably within the traditional paradigm:
managers were monitored by regulators, who acted both as governmental
overseer and relational investor. Several characteristic aspects of financial
firm activity made this paradigm possible. For decades, the managers of
many banks had the great luxury of enjoying what, in effect, amounted to a
local monopoly. Banks alone were permitted to offer traditional deposit
accounts, and regulators carefully limited access to bank franchises.51 And
although insurance companies were less insulated from competition, the fire
wall set up by the Glass-Steagall Act ensured that banks would stay out of
the insurance business. In both banking and insurance, managers were
notoriously cautious.52 They viewed regulators as their principal monitor, and
they faced little or no threat from ex post correctives such as hostile
takeovers.
In the last three decades, changes in the financial markets have put
tremendous pressure on the traditional approach to bank and insurance
governance. More than ever before, banks and insurance companies face the
same kinds of competitive pressures that have long shaped other industries.
These changes in their product markets have prompted changes in bank and
insurance company governance. Mergers and other combinations are no
longer rare, and outside investors have begun to play an increasingly
49. See, e.g., Forney, supra note 46, at 819.
50. See, e.g., NAIC MODEL ACT § 17 (commissioner as rehabilitator); id. § 19 (commissioner as
liquidator).
51. See, e.g., Klausner, supra note 29, at 699-705.
52. For contemporaneous accounts of this tendency in banking, see A. Dale Tussing, The Case for
Bank Failure, 10 J.L. & ECON. 129, 130-31 (1967) (citing CHRIS ARGYRIS, ORGANIZATION OF A BANK: A
STUDY OF THE NATURE OF ORGANIZATION AND THE FUSION PROCESS (1954); Robert N. McMurry,
Recruitment, Dependency, and Morale in the Banking Industry, 3 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 87 (1958)).
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important role.
This Part describes the transformation of bank and insurance company
governance and attempts to determine how far the changes will go. The Part
begins, in the first section, by describing the most important recent
developments. Although regulatory barriers will limit the scope of these
changes, increased reliance on market-based monitoring devices will put
enormous pressure on the traditional insolvency framework. The second and
third sections consider how to adjust bank and insurance insolvency
regulation to better fit current governance patterns. The Part concludes by
considering the existing regulatory structure, focusing in particular on the
question whether to include bank and insurance insolvency in the bankruptcy
laws that regulate the insolvency of nonfinancial firms.
A. The Ex Post Turn in Bank and Insurance Governance
In banking, increased competition dates back to the emergence of market
alternatives to traditional bank loans in the 1960s and 1970s. As large firms
began to issue commercial paper rather than borrowing from banks, and with
the increased use of the securities markets for raising capital, banks’
traditional role as lender of choice became more precarious.53 Ironically, the
same laws that had insulated banks from competition made it difficult for
banks to compete in the new marketplace. For instance, the McFadden Act54
and related laws limited banks’ ability to expand geographically, and the
Glass-Steagall Act restricted the range of products banks could offer.55
Changes in the financial markets have had a similar effect on the
insurance industry. Insurance companies had always been less protected from
competition than banks, and they too have faced challenges from the new
financial landscape.
In order to compete, banks have not only acceded to, but have actively
encouraged, the dismantling of many of the reforms set in place during the
New Deal. The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act
of 199456 has eliminated most of the geographical restrictions created by the
53. For an extensive account, see David G. Litt et al., Politics, Bureaucracies, and Financial
Markets: Bank Entry into Commercial Paper Underwriting in the United States and Japan, 139 U. PA. L.
REV. 369 (1990).
54. Act of Feb. 25, 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-639, 44 Stat. 1224 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§ 36 (1994 & Supp. III 1997)).
55. See, e.g., Klausner, supra note 29, at 726-36.
56. Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Banking Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-328,
108 Stat. 2338 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
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McFadden Act.57 And although rumors of the death of the Glass-Steagall Act
continue to prove premature, the walls between commercial banking,
investment banking, and insurance have eroded considerably, making the
repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act seem inevitable.58
Increased competition has led to remarkable changes in bank and
insurance governance. The most visible change in bank governance has been
the wave of bank takeovers in this decade.59 Until recently, the market for
bank control had been almost nonexistent. Now, scarcely a week goes by
without news of a proposed bank merger. Much as with U.S. nonfinancial
firms, takeovers have become the strategy of choice for addressing
managerial agency costs and other performance concerns, and no
underperforming bank is immune.60
Managerial compensation, and the overall managerial labor market, has
undergone a similar transformation. Banks traditionally have paid their
managers less, and relied less on performance-based compensation, than
nonfinancial firms, just as one would expect with a heavily-regulated
industry.61 With increasing competition, and as the decline of geographical
barriers has unleashed the takeover market, banks have substantially
increased their use of incentive-based compensation. The shift has been most
pronounced with firms that have high charter values and as geographical
obstacles to expansion have been removed.62 As with their counterparts in
other industries, banks that have significant growth opportunities now seek to
inspire their managers with incentive-based compensation.
57. For a detailed description, see Mark D. Rollinger, Interstate Banking and Branching Under the
Riegle-Neal Act of 1994, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 183 (1996).
58. See, e.g., Kuntz, supra note 2, at A24 (noting continued failure to repeal).
59. See Berger et al., supra note 2. Banking scholars are sharply divided on the desirability of the
consolidation that has resulted. Compare Geoffrey P. Miller, Legal Restrictions on Bank Consolidation: An
Economic Analysis, 77 IOWA L. REV. 1083 (1992) (defending consolidation), with Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr.,
Too Big to Fail, Too Few to Serve? The Potential Risks of Nationwide Banks, 77 IOWA L. REV. 957 (1992)
(criticizing consolidation).
60. One difference, however, is that nearly all of the bank takeovers have been consensual mergers—
at least in form.
61. In the corporate finance literature, proponents of the “contracting theory” of executive
compensation predict that the managers of regulated firms will be paid less, and will receive less
performance-based compensation, because effective managers have less room to distinguish
themselves. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and Top-Management
Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225 (1990).
62. See Joel F. Houston & Christopher James, CEO Compensation and Bank Risk: Is Compensation
in Banking Structured to Promote Risk Taking?, 36 J. MONETARY ECON. 405 (1995) (banks with high
franchise value use more incentive compensation); R. Glenn Hubbard & Darius Palia, Executive Pay and
Performance: Evidence from the U.S. Banking Industry, 39 J. FIN. ECON. 105 (1995) (deregulation by
states has led to higher pay, greater use of performance-based compensation, and higher managerial
turnover).
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The trend in all of this should be clear. Bank and insurance governance is
more market driven than ever before and has taken on many of the ex post
characteristics we tend to associate with other types of widely held U.S.
firms. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to conclude that bank and
insurance governance will soon look just like nonfinancial firm governance.
The same forces that produced the New Deal reforms in financial regulation
ensure that any changes in bank and insurance governance will stop well
short of a true ex post framework.
The principal countervailing force is the perception that banks (and, to a
somewhat lesser extent, insurance companies) play a unique role in the
economy. Although the financial markets are far more stable than in the
Depression, the belief that bank depositors and the payment system as a
whole must be protected continues to resonate deeply.63 So long as the
deposit insurance framework remains in place to address these concerns,
regulators will continue to play a crucial dual role: overseeing healthy banks
and, when a bank fails, stepping into depositors’ shoes as the largest single
creditor of the bank. For bank governance as a whole, regulators will
continue to function very much like the relational investors of nonfinancial
firms in an ex ante governance framework.
Bank takeovers present perhaps the best evidence of the analogy between
bank regulators and large private investors. Notwithstanding the recent wave
of takeovers, regulators still stand squarely between any would-be bidder and
a bank targeted for acquisition.64 Even more than the relational investors of a
German or Japanese firm, bank regulators can simply refuse to let a takeover
bid go through.65
The story with incentive-based compensation is quite similar. Although
many more banks use incentive-based compensation than in the past, they
still lag behind nonfinancial firms in employing this strategy.66 An obvious
reason is that, despite the market revolution, banks remain far more heavily
regulated than other firms and face substantial limitations on their investment
opportunities. The theory of this Article suggests that the prospect for
immediate displacement in the event of failure, and the relatively thin
managerial labor market, further undermine the attractiveness to managers of
incentive-based compensation.
63. See, e.g., DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, MODERNIZING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SAFER, MORE COMPETITIVE BANKS 2-3 (1991) [hereinafter TREASURY REPORT].
64. See Bernstein, supra note 36, at 221-24.
65. See Berger et al., supra note 2 (manuscript at 8-9, on file with Law Quarterly) (speculating that
restrictions allowing only banks to acquire other banks, together with regulatory approval process, may
explain dearth of hostile takeovers).
66. See Houston & James, supra note 62.
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Each of these factors also applies to insurance companies, though in a
slightly muted form. Concern over protecting policyholders ensures that
regulators will remain at the heart of insurance firm governance. Moreover,
insurance company regulators are also in a position to dampen the scope and
effectiveness of ex post correctives such as takeovers.
In the banking context especially, commentators have proposed a wide
variety of reforms that would inject more market-based monitoring into
financial firm governance.67 Proposals include partial privatization of deposit
insurance,68 implementation of a system of cross-guarantees,69 and a
requirement that banks issue a minimum amount of subordinated debt with
an imbedded put option.70 Each of the proposals has much-noted limitations,
and the effectiveness of all of the proposals remains untested.71 For pr s nt
purposes, an interesting characteristic of the proposals is that, like the
existing framework, each is ex ante in orientation. They are each designed to
discourage failure, either by supplementing regulators with a private monitor
(private insurance, cross-guarantees) or by penalizing firms that encounter
financial distress (subdebt with put options).
The upshot of this analysis is that absent a dramatic change in the
regulatory framework, regulators’ dual role as monitor and, in effect,
relational creditor seriously limits the extent to which the market revolution
in banking and insurance can blur the distinctions between financial and
nonfinancial firm governance. Although the increased influence of market
forces is dramatic and probably permanent, financial intermediary
governance will remain more ex ante than ex post in orientation.
Although these conclusions are primarily descriptive, the analysis has
important normative implications as well. One implication concerns the rapid
consolidation of the banking industry. Much of the consolidation reflects the
removal of artificial barriers to expansion and will produce a more sensible
allocation of banking assets. But the analysis of this Part suggest that critics’
attacks on the consolidation trend are not entirely unfounded.72 Beca se the
67. For a useful overview and critique of the proposals, see TREASURY REPORT, supra note 63, at
VII-1 to VII-37. See also Skeel, supra note 33, at 736-39.
68. See, e.g., Herbert Baer, Private Prices, Public Insurance: The Pricing of Federal Deposit
Insurance, FED. RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO ECON. PERSP., Sept./Oct. 1985, at 47.
69. See, e.g., Thomas E. Petry & Bert Ely, Real Taxpayer Protection: Sound Deposit Insurance
Through Cross-Guarantees, POL’Y REV., Spring 1992, at 25.
70. See, e.g., Larry D. Wall, A Plan for Reducing Future Deposit Insurance Losses: Puttable
Subordinated Debt, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA ECON. REV., July/Aug. 1989, at 2-3.
71. A pervasive complaint is that, unlike regulators, market players would not have an adequate
incentive to take systemic factors (such as the risk that one bank failure would precipitate other failures)
into account. See Skeel, supra note 33, at 737-38.
72. Arthur Wilmarth has been the most vocal critic in the legal literature. See, e.g., Arthur E.
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ex ante governance approach is more effective at preserving going concern
value than at reallocating it (that is, ex ante governance relies less on creative
destruction), consolidation may be less “reversible” than with ex post
governance.73 More than with nonfinancial firms, there may be substantial
barriers to downsizing once a bank or insurer has expanded, a problem that is
compounded by regulators’ unwillingness, under the “too big to fail”
doctrine, to allow large banks to fail.74
A second implication concerns the recent debate in the corporate law
literature as to whether financial intermediaries should be given more
flexibility to participate in the governance of nonfinancial U.S. firms.75 Given
the risk aversion encouraged by ex ante governance, we could expect bank or
insurance firm monitors to discourage risk taking by the nonfinancial firms
they monitored. In particular, and as noted earlier, banks themselves are
heavily leveraged and tend to hold large debt stakes, which will influence
their perspective as monitors. Moreover, regulators’ efforts to assure the
banks’ safety and soundness also will affect the way banks monitor
nonfinancial firms.76
B. Opening Up Bank Insolvency Regulation
The rapid consolidation of the banking and insurance industries and the
increasing competition have been dramatic and visible. The same
developments that have altered bank and insurance governance will also put
pressure on the existing insolvency framework.
Wilmarth, Jr., Too Good to be True? The Unfulfilled Promises Behind Big Bank Mergers, 2 STAN.
J.L., BUS. & FIN. 1 (1995); Wilmarth, supra note 59.
73. For a fascinating discussion of the relationship between size and the reversibility of
organizations generally, see Saul Levmore, Irreversibility and the Law: The Size of Firms and Other
Organizations, 18 J. CORP. L. 333 (1993).
74. Notice that this suggests that careful antitrust scrutiny, which has been advocated by both
critics and (in much weaker form) proponents of consolidation, may not address all of the potential
problems posed by consolidation.
75. Bernard Black has been the most enthusiastic advocate of such steps. See Black, supra note 
8.
76. For a discussion of the problems caused by regulatory intervention in troubled banks under
the “implicit safety net” in Japan, see Curtis J. Milhaupt, Japan’s Experience with Deposit Insurance
and Failing Banks: Implications for Financial Regulatory Design, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 399 (1999).
Interestingly, at the same time as commentators have advocated greater involvement by financial
intermediaries in the governance of nonfinancial firms, there has been an increase in the opposite
phenomenon: nonfinancial firm ownership of banks and thrifts. Due to a loophole in the Bank Holding
Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2)(F) (1994), many retailers now own “credit card banks”; and the
Savings and Loan Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(c)(3), permits nonfinancial firms to own
one thrift. The nonfinancial firm owners of these banks and thrifts can be expected to bring their ex
post perspective to bear on their governance of the financial firms they run.
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In the early 1990s, Congress passed FDICIA in an effort to address the
widespread dissatisfaction with regulators’ handling of the savings and loan
and bank crises. Because regulators have an incentive to wait too long to
initiate insolvency proceedings, FDICIA utilizes a command and control
approach that requires regulators to take action at specified stages in a bank’s
financial decline.77 Most dramatically, FDICIA instructs regulators to initiate
an insolvency proceeding when a bank’s assets exceed its liabilities by less
than two percent.78
Most commentators correctly view FDICIA as a significant improvement
on the prior framework.79 Sweeping as they are, however, the new reforms
have an unfortunate limitation: they continue to assume that regulators alone
should decide whether and when to initiate an insolvency proceeding and
how to dispose of an insolvent bank’s assets. Unlike those of other U.S.
firms, the managers of a troubled bank are not given a role.
The traditional explanation for displacing managers at the outset of an
insolvency proceeding was probabilistic. When banks failed, their failure
almost always stemmed from gross mismanagement or fraud.80 Thus,
lawmakers simply assumed that displacing managers was the first step in
addressing bank failure. In an era when banks enjoyed local monopolies, the
assumption made a great deal of sense. But as the competitiveness of banking
markets continues to rise, an increasing percentage of bank failures will stem
from competition rather than mismanagement.81
Softening the presumptive displacement of managers and including
managers in the insolvency process makes sense for two reasons. First,
although the auditing process gives regulators a great deal of information
about bank performance, bank managers have even more. Far more than
77. FDICIA establishes five zones of bank capital. Zones 1 and 2 reflect at least adequate capital,
whereas increasingly serious undercapitalization is reflected in Zones 3, 4, and 5. FDICIA imposes specific
sanctions for Zone 3 and Zone 4 banks and calls for the merger of, or initiation of insolvency proceedings
for, Zone 5 banks. The Zones are defined at 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(b)(1) (1994). The requirements and
sanctions are codified at section 1831o(d)-(h). For a more detailed description, see Klausner, supra note 29,
at 760-64.
78. See 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(c)(3)(B) (1994). Lawmakers assumed that, due to accounting inaccuracies,
a bank whose books reflect only two percent tangible capital is likely to be insolvent in reality. See, e.g.,
Peter P. Swire, Bank Insolvency Law Now That It Matters Again, 42 DUKE L.J. 469, 489 n.93 (1992).
79. See, e.g., Wayne D. Angell, Bank Capital: Lessons from the Past and Thoughts for the Future, 27
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 603, 610 (1992) (describing FDICIA as notable improvement). On the other hand,
many commentators also express reservations. The principal complaint is that regulators still have
substantial discretion, even under the prompt corrective action requirements. See, e.g., David S. Jones &
Kathleen Kuester King, The Implementation of Prompt Corrective Action: An Assessment, 19 J. BANKING
& FIN. 491, 508-09 (1995).
80. See, e.g., Swire, supra note 78, at 507-08.
81. See, e.g., id. at 509-10 (increased competition); but see, e.g., id. at 510-18 (describing factors that
make fraud in banks still more likely than in other firms).
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regulators, bank managers will have information about issues such as market
trends, possible consolidations, and products likely to appeal to the bank’s
particular customer base. This kind of information is both crucial and too
impressionistic for regulators to develop. Harnessing this information could
lead to better decisions on whether, when, and how to initiate and conduct
insolvency proceedings.
Second, enlisting managers in the initiation decision would reinforce the
shift toward more market driven governance. For instance, manager initiation
would decrease managers’ incentives to forestall insolvency proceedings and,
as we shall see, could expand the market for bank control to include
marginally insolvent firms as well as solvent ones.
In one respect, Congress already has incorporated managers into the
insolvency process. In 1989 Congress enacted “cross-guarantee” obligations
that require the banking subsidiaries of a bank holding company to infuse
capital into a failing subsidiary as part of FIRREA.82 And in 1991 FDICIA
added “controlling company” obligations that encourage a holding company
to guarantee a troubled banking subsidiary’s compliance with submitted and
accepted restoration plans.83 Because most banks are part of a holding
company,84 these obligations ensure that the managers of most banks have an
obligation to support a failing subsidiary. But the holding company’s
obligations are limited in important respects. These obligations do not apply
to firms that do not belong to a holding company,85 for instance, and the
obligations only have bite if the holding company has significant assets
outside of the troubled banking subsidiary.86 Moreover, if insolvency
82. See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73,
103 Stat. 183 (codified as amended in scattered titles and sections of U.S.C.). The cross-guarantee
provisions are set forth in 12 U.S.C. § 1815(e) (1994). For a discussion of liabilities and amounts of
compensation, see Lissa Lamkin Broome, Redistributing Bank Insolvency Risks: Challenges to Limited
Liability in the Bank Holding Company Structure, 26 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 935, 960-62 (1993).
83. See 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(e)(2)(C)(ii) (1994). The controlling company provision limits the holding
company’s liability from that guarantee to the lesser of five percent of a troubled bank’s liabilities, or
enough to restore the troubled bank’s standard, required capital. See id. § 1831o(e)(2)(E). For a general
description, see Broome, supra note 82, at 963-67. See also Howell E. Jackson, The Expanding Obligations
of Financial Holding Companies, 107 HARV. L. REV. 507, 536-39 (1994).
84. See Allen N. Berger et al., The Transformation of the U.S. Banking Industry: What a Long,
Strange Trip It’s Been, in 2 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 55, 65-68 (William C. Brainard
& George L. Perry eds., 1995) (substantial majority of bank assets in holding companies).
85. In view of this, Howell Jackson proposed an expanded holding-company liability framework that
would impose comparable requirements on nonholding company banks (or, in the alternative, compensate
holding companies for their extra burden through adjustments such as more lenient capital requirements).
See Jackson, supra note 83, at 615-19 app.
86. See Skeel, supra note 33, at 750; cf. Jackson, supra note 83, at 603 (obligations only effective to
extent of holding company solvency to support subsidiary). In addition, the holding company obligations do
not actually require the holding company to infuse capital into a troubled subsidiary. Absent an infusion,
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proceedings become necessary, the holding company provisions continue to
presume that managers will have no role to play.
By itself, leaving managers in place would not improve on the existing
approach. Because regulators control every aspect of the process, and
insolvency proceedings always lead to liquidation, initiation would still be
much less attractive to managers than attempting to forestall the proceedings.
In other work, I have argued that lawmakers could assure timely initiation
either by structuring a bonus plan that rewarded managers for initiating in a
timely fashion or by penalizing managers for failing to do so, as is done in
nonfinancial firm governance and insolvency in some other nations.87
Lawmakers could achieve the same effect in a more practical way by giving
managers at least a modicum of control over the insolvency process. In
bankruptcies involving U.S. nonfinancial firms, for instance, managers’
ability to propose a reorganization plan (which often ensures shareholders at
least a limited recovery) gives managers a much greater incentive to file for
bankruptcy than they would otherwise have.88
Adding a full-blown reorganization option is much less attractive for
banks than for nonfinancial firms. The reorganization process takes time.
Even with deposit insurance, prolonged negotiations might well lead to
depositor runs. Moreover, the presence of a single, central creditor—the
FDIC—diminishes the coordination problems that justify reorganization in
other contexts.89
Although full-blown reorganization would not make sense for banks,
another reorganization technique—prepackaged bankruptcy—offers much
more promise. In a prepackaged plan, managers negotiate a reorganization
plan before they file for bankruptcy and submit it along with their bankruptcy
petition.90 Prepackaged plans dramatically reduce the duration of the
regulators would refuse to approve a capital restoration plan for the subsidiary; but, in theory, the holding
company could simply allow the subsidiary to fail. See id. at 539.
87. See, e.g., Skeel, supra note 33, at 745-64. The most promising approach would be to establish an
initiation bonus for shareholders in the event the firm initiates insolvency proceedings, see id. at 754-62, or
to give managers “phantom debt” that they can redeem after termination or insolvency. Id. at 753-54.
In addition to assuring more timely initiation of insolvency proceedings, another attraction of
encouraging managerial initiation is that it would contribute to the further expansion of the managerial
labor market. To the extent initiation reflects factors other than fraud or gross misperformance,
managers of failed firms should have better future prospects in the managerial labor market than they
currently do.
88. See generally Skeel, supra note 33.
89. This is another respect in which bank governance parallels the ex ante corporate governance
approaches used in Germany and Japan. Much like the FDIC, concentrated investors such as banks
eliminate for German and Japanese firms the coordination problems that make manager-driven
reorganization necessary for nonfinancial corporations in the United States.
90. For a general description of this process, see Marc. S. Kirschner et al., Prepackaged Bankruptcy
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bankruptcy case because they obviate the need for time-consuming postfiling
negotiations.
One can easily imagine the attraction of this approach for banks. Under
existing law, a troubled bank that is at or near insolvency is a poor candidate
for a merger because of the low or negative value the bank would have to
give any acquirer that agreed to purchase all of its assets and liabilities.91 Yet
a merger will often be the best solution to the problems of a troubled bank,
and the bank’s managers can be expected to appreciate the alternatives better
than anyone else. Managers of such banks currently have an incentive to
disguise the firm’s troubles for as long as possible because failure means
immediate displacement. By contrast, if managers could propose a
prepackaged purchase and assumption transaction that transferred some but
not all of the firm’s liabilities to an acquirer, they would have far more reason
to contribute to the insolvency decision. As a result, a bank could transfer its
assets while much of its franchise value remains intact, and it would do so
with the managers’ participation rather than their resistance.
In effect, a prepackaged P&A would enable the managers of a troubled
bank to obtain an implicit side payment from the acquiring bank, such as a
promise of continued employment, in return for their participation in the
initiation decision. In some circumstances, the prepackaged P&A option
might even counteract regulators’ own political disincentives to initiate
insolvency proceedings because a prepackaged P&A proposal would force
the issue.
An important question is whether manager-initiated P&As could be
effectively integrated into the current framework, which depends on secrecy
and decisive regulator action. On inspection, formal managerial involvement
should not pose a serious problem. Bank managers could make their proposal
to regulators in secret. Once a bank’s managers put a prepackaged P&A on
the table, it seems unlikely that regulators would balk if the proposal made
Plans: The Deleveraging Tool of the ’90s in the Wake of OID and Tax Concerns, 21 SETON HALL L. REV.
643 (1991).
91. Bank regulators have sometimes agreed to mergers that required an infusion of cash, but this has
been the exception rather than the rule. See generally Berger et al., supra note 2 (manuscript at 9, on file
with Law Quarterly) (noting that “[d]uring periods of financial crisis, the government may provide financial
assistance or otherwise aid in the consolidation of troubled financial institutions”).
The combination of regulators’ “least costly” disposition requirement and the recently enacted
depositor preference provision limits regulators’ ability to provide assistance both under existing law
and under the prepackaged P&A option I have proposed. “Least costly” disposition requires the FDIC
to choose the disposition option that is least costly to the insurance fund. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(A)(ii)
(1994). The depositor preference provision gives priority to depositor’s claims. See id. § 1821(d)(11)
(1994). Because depositors have priority, straight liquidation would often pay depositors in full, thus
proving less costly than a P&A that required an infusion of cash from the FDIC. For additional
discussion, see Skeel, supra note 33, at 770-71.
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sense.92
Much of the preceding analysis is framed in normative terms—as an
argument about what lawmakers should do. But a similar point can be made
from a descriptive perspective. As the traditional restrictions on banks erode
and bank governance becomes more market-driven, these trends will also put
pressure on the insolvency framework. An increasing number of bank
failures will reflect factors other than managerial fraud, and managers may
well take affirmative steps in an effort to evade immediate displacement on
insolvency. One such step would be to propose a prepackaged purchase and
assumption to regulators—one that preserves some continued role for the
existing managers. Thus, we reach the same substantive result as we had
under the normative perspective.
C. Reorganizing Failed Insurers?
As we have seen, the recent trends in insurance governance closely
parallel the overall direction in banking. Although regulators remain a
pervasive presence, market competition plays an increasingly prominent role.
As in banking, the same developments that have altered insurer governance
will also put pressure on the insurance company insolvency framework.
Once again, a key limitation of insurance insolvency regulation is the
assumption that managers should always be replaced. Permitting managers to
participate, at least in a limited way, could significantly improve the decision
whether and when to initiate an insolvency proceeding. Interestingly, the
appropriate role for managers might be appreciably larger in insurance
insolvency than in banking insolvency. In contrast to banks, where the risk of
depositor runs requires that the insolvency proceeding be kept short and
relatively secret, timing is less crucial to insurance companies.93 Even in the
existing framework, large insurance insolvency cases parallel the
reorganization of nonfinancial firms in many respects. These cases take
substantially longer than bank insolvencies, and the regulators involved in
them are much more likely to preserve the existing firm.
These differences suggest that a much stronger case is made for adopting
a more extensive, manager-driven reorganization option in insurance
insolvency cases than in bank insolvency cases. A limited reorganization
period would give managers a powerful incentive to participate in the
92. Notice that this suggests that although regulators’ decision on the proposal should be subject to
judicial review, the review should be as deferential as it is on other banking issues.
93. See Skeel, supra note 33, at 776-77 (noting that many policyholders cannot easily switch
insurance companies and regulators can freeze insurance policies).
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insolvency decision and would ensure a more timely resolution of an
insurer’s insolvency.94 The principal question with this reform is whether
insurance firms have sufficient going concern value to make reorganization
worthwhile. Insurance firms have liquid assets and a more limited franchise
value even than banks. Although this reduces the usefulness of insurer
reorganization, the prospect of timely initiation would justify at least a
limited manager-driven reorganization option.
Even if lawmakers were to adopt a full-blown reorganization option,
insurance governance would still fall well short of a true ex post regime. As
with relational creditors in an ex ante regime, regulators’ pervasive authority
would impose substantial limits on managers’ flexibility. The system would
be more market-driven than in the past, but subject to a wide range of
regulatory constraints that make the framework, at most, intermediate in
character.
D. Regulatory Structure and the Bankruptcy Code
Just as focusing on the overall governance framework illuminates both
the governance of solvent firms and the treatment of insolvent ones, it also
casts a useful light on the existing regulatory structure. For instance, even as
the boundaries blur between the different types of financial firms, the
regulatory structure will continue to force financial entities that wish to
combine to do so through separate corporations.95 In addition to the
traditional justifications for separation, separating bank and insurance
company subsidiaries makes sense from a governance perspective, given the
different insolvency approaches appropriate to each. On the other hand, the
governance benefits of requiring separation between commercial and
investment banks are less clear.
For the most part, I leave analysis of the regulators and their jurisdiction
to other work. But one regulatory issue warrants a somewhat closer look—
particularly given the emphasis this Article places on insolvency regulation.
That issue is whether lawmakers should continue to exclude banks and
insurance companies from the bankruptcy provisions that govern other
insolvent U.S. firms.
The traditional explanation for excluding banks and insurance companies
94. See id. at 778.
95. This is currently the case. For a general discussion of so-called “Section 20” investment banking
subsidiaries of commercial banks, see Rahul Bhargava & Donald R. Fraser, On the Wealth and Risk Effects
of Commercial Bank Expansion into Securities Underwriting: An Analysis of Section 20 Subsidiaries, 22 J.
BANKING & FIN. 447 (1998).
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from the Bankruptcy Code is that each is extensively regulated outside of
bankruptcy. As a result, bank and insurance regulators are better positioned
to oversee the insolvency process than a bankruptcy judge would be.96 For
banks, the traditional explanation ultimately proves persuasive, though a bit
simplistic. First, consider the limitations of the traditional explanation.
Although bank regulators have unique expertise on banking issues, the
FDIC’s interest as a creditor creates a systematic (and potentially inefficient)
bias in favor of public depositors as against other creditors.97 In addition, the
existence of an expert regulator has not precluded Congress from including
other kinds of firms in the Bankruptcy Code. For example, broker-dealers are
extensively regulated by the SEC outside of bankruptcy, yet they are still
subject to bankruptcy jurisdiction.98
Despite these quibbles, leaving bank insolvency to bank regulators is
nevertheless defensible. Given the importance of speed and secrecy, little
would be gained by adding another decision maker to the process.99
Moreover, the FDIC’s status as dominant creditor diminishes the
coordination problems that make bankruptcy jurisdiction necessary in other
contexts.
This question becomes much closer if we turn from banks to insurance
companies. As we have seen, timing is less crucial for troubled insurers, and
insurance insolvency would benefit from a traditional reorganization
option.100 These facts suggest that including insurance companies in the
Bankruptcy Code might make sense. Reinforcing this are the jurisdictional
limitations of the existing insurance insolvency process. Because insurance is
regulated by the states, and because each state has only a limited
jurisdictional reach, regulators must set up separate receiverships in each
state in which an insolvent insurer does business.101 Unfortunately, even if
state insurance commissioners retained broad oversight authority over the
bankruptcy process, it is not at all clear that adding insurers to the
96. For a good (though critical) discussion of the traditional rationale for exclusion, see Michael I.
Sovern, Section 4 of the Bankruptcy Act: The Excluded Corporations, 42 MINN. L. REV. 171 (1957).
97. See, e.g., Note, Unsecured Creditors of Failed Banks: It’s Not a Wonderful Life, 104 HARV. L.
REV. 1052 (1991) (criticizing differential treatment of bank creditors by FDIC). Now that depositors have
explicit priority under depositor preference, see supra note 91, regulators’ bias may not have as significant
an effect.
98. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 741-752 (1994) (stockbroker liquidation); id. §§ 761-766 (commodity broker
liquidation).
99. See, e.g., Robert Charles Clark, The Soundness of Financial Intermediaries, 86 YALE L.J. 1, 99-
100 (1976) (same conclusion).
100. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., Sovern, supra note 96, at 209-11 (quoting from Prefatory Note to Uniform Insurers
Liquidation Act to note difficulties in insurance regulation).
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Bankruptcy Code will ever be politically feasible.102 If such a change were
possible, this Article suggests that the reform would be a good one.103
CONCLUSION
The recent past has been a time of extraordinary transition in the financial
services industry. Along with increasingly competitive markets have come
the crisis of the 1980s, subsequent recovery, and the continued erosion of
many of the regulatory strictures that have long defined banking and
insurance.
This Article argues that the best way to appreciate banking and insurance
governance is to consider how governance strategies interact with the
background insolvency rules. In contrast to the governance of other U.S.
firms, which has long relied on markets and ex post correctives, bank and
insurance governance traditionally has depended on ex ante monitoring by
regulators as well as an insolvency framework that discourages failure at all
costs.
Viewing bank and insurance governance through this lens reveals an
intriguing tension in recent banking reforms. In order to help banks compete
in the financial marketplace, lawmakers and regulators have loosened many
of the geographical and product market restrictions that have limited banks’
flexibility. At the same time, lawmakers have taken steps to reduce the
flexibility of bank insolvency procedures.104 For now, the overall effect is an
increase in the role of takeovers and other market correctives, yet financial
102. The most obvious political opposition would come from state insurance commissioners. It is not
clear whether the managers of insurers would actively support a proposal to include insurance insolvency
(together with a reorganization option) in the Bankruptcy Code, although they would be the principal
beneficiaries. See generally Skeel, An Evolutionary Theory, supra note 3, at 1365-66 (discussing fact that
managers of nonfinancial firms have not participated actively in legislative reform of bankruptcy laws,
probably because managers tend to assume that their firm will not become insolvent). Reformers could
reduce insurance commissioners’ likely opposition by ensuring them with a decisive say in the process, but
state commissioners almost certainly would continue to oppose such a change.
In recent years, as an alternative to federalizing insurance insolvency, insurance reformers have
discussed the possibility of an interstate compact to deal with the limitations of insolvency jurisdiction.
103. This conclusion reflects a change in my earlier views on the issue. See Skeel, supra note 33, at
726 n.5 (suggesting that neither bank nor insurance insolvency should be included in the Bankruptcy Code).
Ironically, the best strategy on insolvency might be for Congress to regulate insurance insolvency
but to shift authority over the bankruptcies of other corporations back to the states. This is because
charter competition gives states an incentive to enact generally efficient regulation for the nonfinancial
firms incorporated in the state, as I have argued at length elsewhere. See Skeel, Rethinking the Line,
supra note 3. State lawmakers do not have the same incentive with insurance because courts do not
consistently apply the laws of the domiciliary state in insurance, as they do with other corporations.
104. The common theme, of course, is that lawmakers and regulators wish to give banks the ability to
compete in current markets but want to discourage risk taking that would jeopardize depositors or the
insurance fund.
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firm governance remains squarely within the traditional ex ante regulatory
framework.
In time, however, the increased play of market forces will inevitably
contribute to a new round of bank and insurer failures. This Article suggests
that these failures will put significant pressure on the existing insolvency
options. In the banking context, the pressures could (and, as a normative
matter, should) spur innovations such as manager-initiated purchase and
assumption plans. In the insurance context, the pressures justify going even
further, even as far as establishing a Chapter 11-style reorganization option
and including insurance insolvency in the Bankruptcy Code.
None of these changes would seriously alter the ex ante, regulatory
character of bank and insurance firm governance. Their effect would simply
be to adjust its focus slightly, to shift a bit more authority from regulators to
the regulated parties themselves, and, in doing so, to improve the efficiency
of financial intermediary governance.
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